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INTRODUCTION 
For much of the twentieth century, doctors only recognized pain as a symptom, never 
as an illness in itself. 1 As a result, doctors prescribed opioids, such as morphine and 
oxycodone, to treat short-term pain, but not to treat chronic pain.2 Then, in the 1970s, 
medical professionals became more interested in managing pain and they began to view 
chronic pain as an illness in itself.3 Although perceptions of chronic pain changed, the 
prescription drugs available to treat this illness did not, and doctors remained hesitant to 
treat chronic pain with highly addictive opioids.4 
However, things changed in 1996 when pharmaceutical company Purdue Frederick 
obtained FDA approval for OxyContin, a time-release, less addictive oxycodone pill 
intended to treat chronic pain.5 Purdue Frederick marketed OxyContin as "difficult to 
abuse," in an effort to assuage doctors' fears. 6 Due to this marketing, prescriptions of 
opioids quickly skyrocketed, but unfortunately, so did accidental opioid overdoses.7 
Despite Purdue Frederick's claims, OxyContin (and other opioid analgesics) was actually 
highly susceptible to abuse because it could be "crushed, then swallowed, snorted, or 
injected for a powerful high."8 Several states and individuals sued Purdue Frederick for 
misbranding OxyContin as a non-addictive drug.9 The company ultimately pied guilty 
to a felony charge of misbranding and paid over $600 million in fines. 10 But no fine 
could remedy the destruction caused by the drug and the nation is still burdened by 
opioid abuse. 
1 Ian Frazier, The Antidote: Can Staten Island's A1iddle-Class Neighborhoods Defeat An Overdose 
Epidemic?, NEw YoRKER (Sept. 8, 2014), http://¥lww.ne\;vyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/08/antidote. 
2 Id.; see also Chronic Pain: Symptoms, Diagnosis & Treatment, 6 NIH MEDLINE PLUS 1, 5-6 
(2011 ), http://w\'iw.nlmnih.gov/medlineplus/magazine/issues/spring 11/articles/springl 1 pg5-6.html 
(explaining that short-term pain lasts no longer than twelve weeks and occurs during recovery from 
an injury or procedure or during the progression of terminal illness, while chronic pain is "any pain 
lasting more than 12 weeks"). 
3 Frazier, supra note 1. 
4 See A Nation in Pain: Focusing On US Opioid Trends for Treatment of Short-Term and Longer-
Term Pain 1, 4, EXPRESS ScRJPTS LAB (Dec. 2014), http://lab.express-scripts.com/publications/a-
nation-in-pain (explaining that doctors were reluctant to prescribe opioids because it is easy for 
patients to become addicted to them, as the body can build up a tolerance to opioid drugs and such 
drugs do not have a maximum clinically safe dosage limit) (hereinafter A Nation in Pain). 
5 Frazier, supra note L 
6 Id. 
7 See Alexandra Sifferlin, The Problem with Treating Pain in America, TrME (Jan. 12, 2015), 
http://time.com/3663907/treating-pain-opioids-painkillers/ (explaining that the number of opioid 
prescriptions for pain has almost tripled, from 76 million to 219 million between 1991-2011, and the 
number of hospitalizations and deaths related to opioid addiction has also increased dramatically). 
8 Frazier, supra note 1. 
9 Id. 
10 Id.; Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million, NY TIMES (May 10, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007 /05/l O/business/l ldrug-web.html? _r=O. 
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Prescription opioid overdose death rates quadrupled from 1999-2013.11 During this 
period, almost fifty Americans died from prescription drug overdoses daily. 12 Today, 
Americans make up less than 5% of the world's population, but consume more than 
80% of the world's opiate supply. 13 Opioid abuse has also imposed significant costs on 
the American economy. 14 Fortunately, the United States recently experienced the first 
reduction in opioid overdose deaths in over a decade. 15 And some states, like Florida, 
have seen a dramatic decrease in overdose deaths, largely because of their initiatives 
aimed at curtailing opioid overprescribing. 16 
The most successful of these initiatives have been Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Programs (PD MPs), which are electronic databases that monitor opioid prescriptions. 
Because PDMPs have proven to both curb medically unnecessary opioid prescriptions 
and reduce opioid mortality, all but one state legislature has enacted legislation to 
create a PDMP. 17 The lone holdout is the state of Missouri. Although residents of seven 
neighboring states with PDMPs travel to Missouri to procure opioids and Missouri 
has become known as "America's Drug Store," its legislature has refused to establish a 
PDMP. 18 Conservative lawmakers in Missouri cite patient privacy concerns for their past 
refusal to pass a PDMP. In March of 2015, the state's senate passed a bill authorizing 
a PDMP, but it contained numerous measures designed to protect patient privacy. The 
Missouri senate bill was ultimately not enacted into law, but this Article will argue that 
Missouri legislators' concerns about patient privacy are not compelling. 
This Article will explain why the Missouri state legislature should pass a statute to 
authorize a PDMP. It will then outline why drafting a robust and effective PDMP will 
not violate the Constitution, or federal and state privacy regulations. 
11 Injury Prevention and Control: Prescription Drug Overdose, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, http://v.;w-w.cdc.gov/drngoverdose/data/index.html. 
12 Id. 
13 A Nation in Pain, supra note 4 at 4. 
14 Id. (including $42 billion in lost productivity, $8.2 billion in increased criminal justice costs, $2.2 
billion for drug abuse treatment, and $944 million in medical complications). 
15 Margaret Warner, Holly Hedegaard, & Li-Hui Chen, Trends in 
nu'""'""·' and Heroin: United States, 1999-2012, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION (Dec. 2014 ), http:/ /www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/ drug_poisoning/ drug_poisoning.htm 
(repmiing a 5% decline in opioid-analgesic overdose deaths between 2011 and 2012). 
16 See Hal Johnson et al., Decline in Drug Overdose State CENTERS 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://\YWW.cdc.gov/Illi11V\'T/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6326a3. 
htm (stating that overdose deaths from oxycodone have decreased 52. l %, while overall death rates 
for prescription have decreased 23.2%). 
17 Jeffrey Levi et al., Prescription Strategies to Stop the 2013 1, 16, 
TRUST FORAMERJCA's HEALTH, (Oct. 2013), http://healthyamericans.org/reports/drngabuse2013/ 
TFAH20 l 3RxDrugAbuseRpt l 2_no _embargo .pdf. 
18 Alan Schwarz, Missouri Alone in Resisting Prescription N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 
2014 ), http:/ /wwvv.nytimes.com/2014/07 /21/us/missouri-alone-in-resi sting-prescription-drng-
database.html? _r=O. 
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I. PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAMS: THE BEST 
APPROACH FOR LOWERING OPIOID OVERDOSE RATES 
In response to increased opioid abuse and overdoses, states have implemented various 
regulatory initiatives, including anti-doctor-shopping laws, increased Medicaid 
reimbursement for substance abuse treatment, Good Samaritan laws, Naloxone Access 
laws, physical exam and ID requirements for opioid prescriptions, Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Programs, and Pharmacy Lock-in Programs. 19 Many of these initiatives 
try to prevent abusers from obtaining multiple prescriptions from different providers. 
Two of the most popular initiatives that impact doctor prescribing and patient access to 
opioids are anti-doctor shopping laws and Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs.20 
Every state in America has an anti-doctor-shopping law, requiring a patient to disclose 
his or her prescription drug history before receiving another prescription from a 
different provider.21 Anti-doctor shopping laws often deter patients from seeking 
medically unnecessary opioids from multiple providers.22 However, once the patient 
discloses the information, the provider has the discretion as to whether to prescribe 
additional opioids or report suspected abuse. Such laws have a limited impact on 
reckless physician prescribing practices. For this reason, every state, except Missouri, 
also has a Prescription Drug Monitoring Program.23 
A PDMP is an electronic database, established and operated by the state, which monitors 
the prescription and dispensation of controlled substances.24 Legislation authorizing a 
PDMP often addresses which regulatory actor[s] will create the database and collect 
and compile the information, as well as the permissible uses of that information.25 A 
state must also allocate funds for the PDMP, although it can obtain supplemental funds 
from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration (SAMHSA).26 
While states' PDMPs vary, they all provide state regulatory bodies, law enforcement 
officials, or pharmacists and physicians access to information that will hopefully identify 
potential opioid abusers.27 At least sixteen of the forty-nine states require physicians 
19 Levi et aL, supra note 17, at 14-15. 
20 Id. at 16. 
21 Id. at 21. 
22 Id. 
23 Id.atl6. 
24 Id. at 18. 
25 See, e.g., Fla. Stat.§ 893.055 (2015). 
26 See Levi et al., supra note 17, at 38 SAMHSA's funding of the Health IT 
which states with grants to use health information to increase access to PDMP 
data); Laxmaiah Manchikanti et al., Evolution National All Schedules Prescription Electronic 
Reporting Act: A Public Treatment and Diversion, 8 PAIN 
PHYSICIAN 4, 335, 336 (2005) that DOJ manages the Harold Rogers l'rc:sc1·1pt10n 
Program, which makes $11 million available to states to monitor pre:scr'lpt1on 
scheduled listed chemical 
27 Levi et al., supra note 17, at 20 
nre:scr·mrmn fraut~ rn•,,;'-'''"'• doctor onu'"'""'"'· 
28 
Health Law & Policy Brief• Volume 10, Issue 1 •Winter 2016 
and/ or pharmacists to check a patient's history in a PDMP before enabling that patient 
to obtain additional opioids.28 PDMPs are particularly effective because they target 
numerous causal pathways that lead to opioid overdoses - they curb improper doctor 
prescribing and patient access to opioids, prevent diversion of drugs, and isolate opioid 
addicts for treatment.29 
Opioid overdose deaths have been declining since 2011.30 While PDMPs are not 
possibly the sole cause of this decrease, they clearly have some positive effect.31 PDMPs 
have been particularly beneficial in Florida and Tennessee. After Tennessee enacted it's 
PDMP in 2013, the state's number of "high utilizers" of opioids (those most at risk 
for opioid overdose) declined by forty-seven percent.32 Florida, which boasted ninety-
eight of the one hundred physicians dispensing the highest volumes of oxycodone in 
the country in 2010, experienced similar success.33 After establishing a PDMP in 2011, 
Florida closed down many of these physicians' "pill mills" and as a result, saw a decline 
of more than seventeen percent in the number of oxycodone overdose deaths. 34 
While PDMPs vary, they are more effective when prescribers, pharmacists, and law 
enforcement have more access to program data.35 When such actors have access to 
PDMPs, they can better prevent opioid abuse and overdoses. 
Brandeis University's Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Center of Excellence36 
has drafted a Model Act, which suggests best practices for PDMPs, provisions of 
which are endorsed by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).37 
The Model Act provides that a prescriber or pharmacist should be able to view a 
28 Id. at 20. 
29 Id. at 35. 
30 See Johnson et al, supra note 16, at 570 (reporting a 16.7% decline in drug overdose deaths 
between 2010 and 2012). 
31 See id. (acknowledging that it is impossible for the CDC to determine which initiatives were 
most responsible for the decline in drug overdose deaths). 
32 A Nation in Pain, supra note 4, at 21. 
33 Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 569. 
34 Id. 
35 See id. at 570 (explaining that providers accessed Florida's PDMP 92 times from September 
through December of2011, which resulted in a decrease in opioid overdoses). 
36 See About the PDMP Center Brandeis University, http://pdmpexcellence.org/about 
(explaining that it is "fm1ded by grants from the US. Department of Justice and Bureau of Justice 
Assistance ... [, and] collaborates with a wide variety of PDMP stakeholders, including federal 
and state governments and agencies, universities, health departments, and medical and pharmacy 
boards"). 
37 See HHS takes strong steps to address overdose, death and aei1enaer.1ce, 
US. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES (Mar. 26, 2015), http://v.'WW.hhs.gov/about/ 
news/20 15 /0 3 /26/hhs-takes-strong-steps-to-address-opioid-drug-related-overdose-death-and-
dependence .html (hereinafter HHS Press Release) (explaining that the HHS Secretary believes 
PDMP effectiveness will increase as "states adopt more evidence-based PDMP practices such as 
collecting data for all controlled substances, proactive reporting to physicians and pharmacists, 
interstate data sharing, and integration with other health IT systems to improve provider use"); see 
also Susan Chaityn Lebovits, Heller Team Helps Fight Prescription Drug Abuse, BRANDEisNOW 
(Mar. 5, 2012), http:!/brandeis.edn/now/2012/march/drngs.html 
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patient's full record in the PDMP, before prescribing or dispensing additional opioids 
to the patient.38 Such access helps the prescriber or pharmacist make the (not always 
clear) distinction between medically necessary treatment and troubling opioid use.39 
After viewing the patient's record in the PDMP, the prescriber or pharmacist may also 
need to obtain additional information from that patient. For example, a patient with 
multiple opioid prescriptions - might be abusing those drugs or might be struggling to 
consistently access medical care and needs help managing pain stemming from multiple 
conditions.40 But by accessing the PDMP, a prescriber or pharmacist can at least start 
the conversation. 
The Model Act also provides that each state's PDMP should be interoperable with other 
PDMPs and electronic health record databases throughout the country.41 In addition, 
the Model Act makes a PDMP accessible to medical providers' licensing boards, so 
they can properly investigate provider misconduct.42 Not all states have adopted these 
updates in the Model Act, but as political pressure intensifies to curb opioid overdoses, 
more states should make these legislative changes to craft more effective PDMPs. 
II. WHAT'S THE DEAL, MISSOURI? 
As forty-nine states look for ways to improve the effectiveness of their established 
PDMPs, the Missouri legislature still refuses to authorize a PDMP.43 Additionally, the 
Missouri legislature has only adopted three countermeasures to reduce opioid overdose 
while most states have adopted six or more.44 Because of the legislature's refusal to 
act, in 2010, Missouri had the seventh highest prescription drug overdose mortality 
rate in the country.45 And since 1999, drug overdose deaths in the state have tripled.46 
38 Prescription Drug Epidemic: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Crime & Terrorism, 112th 
Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of John L Eadie, Director, Prescription Monitoring Program Center of 
Excellence) (hereinafter Prescription Drug Epidemic). 
39 See Christopher A. Griggs, et al., Prescription Drug l'vfonitoring Programs: Examining 
Limitations and Future Approaches, 16 WEST J. EMERG. MED. 67, 68 (2015), http://www.ncbi.nlm. 
nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4307729/ (detailing current challenges in evaluating patient data and 
proposing how to make PD MPs more effective). 
40 Id. 
41 See Prescription Drug Epidemic, supra note 38, at 5; see also Levi et al., supra note 17, at 37 
(explaining that for a PD MP to be effective, "healthcare providers and law enforcement agencies 
[must] be able to share information across state and jurisdictional boundaries"). 
42 Prescription Drug Epidemic, supra note 38, at 7. 
43 See Schwarz, supra note 18 (explaining that although many states have a PDMP, the legislation 
varies as to who has access to the database). 
44 See Levi et al, supra note 17, at 16-17 (explaining that Missouri ( 1) requires a patient to submit 
to a physical exam before obtaining a prescription for opioid analgesics; (2) criminalizes the non-
disclosure of existing opioid prescriptions to a new provider; and (3) "locks in" any Medicaid 
beneficiary suspected of misusing controlled substances with a single provider and pharmacist). 
45 Id. at 12. This paper argues that any state benefits from establishing a PDMP that can serve as 
a central repository of patients' prescriptions for opioids. However, the paper recognizes that other 
factors, including age, social structure, and poverty- may affect a given state's prescription d:mg 
overdose rates. Those other factors are compelling, but beyond the scope of this Article. 
46 Id. 
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Residents of neighboring states have even started traveling to Missouri to fill their 
opioid prescriptions.47 
The lack of a PDMP in Missouri has even brought national attention. In 2012, the 
Director of the White House's Office of National Drug Control Policy visited Missouri 
and urged the state legislature to establish a Prescription Drug Monitoring Program.48 
Some lawmakers have proposed legislation to create a PDMP, but conservatives have 
struck them down,49 citing patient privacy concerns.so However, Missourians are 
growing tired of the legislature's excuses. For example, in February 2015, activists from 
the Missouri Network for Opiate Reform and Recovery carried a coffin filled with 1,000 
pill bottles bearing the names of victims of fatal overdoses to the state capitol building, 
to build political pressure.s 1 
On April 2, 2015, the state senate passed a bill that would authorize a Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Program.s2 The legislation died in the Missouri House Select Committee 
on Insurance,s3 but even if it passed, the resulting PDMP would have been largely 
ineffective. The proposed bill would have authorized the Missouri Department of Health 
and Senior Services to establish and run a Prescription Drug Monitoring Program.s4 It 
would have permitted any provider to report prescriptions for opioids to the database. 
In contrast, it would have required every pharmacist to report every filled prescription 
to the database.ss After submitting information to the database, a pharmacist would 
have received a response from the department, indicating whether the pharmacist should 
have any concern about giving the controlled substance to the patient.s6 If the agency 
indicated any reason for concern, however, the pharmacist would have been permitted 
47 Schwarz, supra note 18. 
48 Cameron Hardesty, Director Kerlikowske Visits Missouri; Urges Adoption of Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Program, THE WHITE HousE (Aug. 17, 2012 11: l 7AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
blog/2012/08/17 /director-kerlikowske-visits-missouri-urges-adoption-prescription-drug-monitoring-
pro. 
49 Id. 
so See, e.g. Kyle Loethen, Missouri Senate Passes Prescription Drug lvlonitoring, M1ssouRINET 
(Apr. 6, 2015), http://WW\¥.missourinet.com/2015/04/06/missouri-senate-passes-prescription-drug-
monitoring-program/ (citing 011e senator's disapproval of systems that collect personal data from 
individuals who have not committed crimes). 
51 Grant Bissell, with Pill Bottles Going to the Missouri Capitol, KSDK (Feb. 23, 2015), 
http://wvvwksdk.com/story/news/politics/2015/02/24/coffin-with-pill-bottles-going-to-mo-
capitol/23922245/. 
52 S.B. 63, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015). 
53 See Current Bill Summary: SB. 63, MISSOURI SENATE, http://www.senate.mo.gov/15info/BTS_ 
Web/Bi!Laspx?SessionType=R&Bil!ID= 156 (last visited Jan. 3, 2016) (showing that the last action 
on the bill was a third reading in the House on May 15, 2015). 
54 See S.B. 63, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015) (proposing that the agency would use the 
system to monitor all schedule H-IV controlled substances licensed and prescribed in the state). 
ss Id. 
56 Id. (stating that dispenser will obtain a response from department after transferring information 
to the database, but not explaining how long it will take to receive such a response). 
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to use his or her judgment as to whether to prescribe the drug.57 The proposed bill also 
would have imposed numerous regulatory prohibitions on access to the database: it 
would have prohibited providers and pharmacists from accessing the data58; would have 
disallowed combining information from the database with patient Electronic Health 
Records data59 ; and would have banned the entry of information from the state PDMP 
into the national PDMP.60 
Although the proposed bill represented a huge step forward for the Missouri Senate, it 
did not follow the PDMP Model Act and if passed, it would have created an ineffective 
PDMP.61 The bill did not mandate that providers actually use the database, which 
researchers believe is a key attribute of a successful PDMP.62 Furthermore, denying 
prescribers and dispensers access to the database would have undermined these 
professionals' ability to treat their patients, and could have resulted in the unwarranted 
denial of opioids to patients who need them.63 The proposed bill also would have 
banned interoperability between the Missouri database and Electronic Health Records64 
although research suggests that information sharing between EHRs and PDMPs 
improves physicians' prescribing decisions. 65 Finally, Missouri's proposed bill would 
have prevented the PDMP from sharing information with the national database, which 
would have combated interstate doctor shopping.66 
III. IS PRIVACY REALLY A BARRIER? 
Missouri's proposed bill would have restricted access to the PDMP primarily to "take 
doctors out of the equation [and not] make them into policemen."67 However, public 
health surveillance activities, such as PDMPs, are not a new form of governance and 
57 Id. (stating that the department will express concern but that it is up to the dispenser to make a 
final judgment). 
58 Id. (noting that "dispensers and prescribers are not required to access the database and they are 
only to input data, not access information"). 
59 Id. (noting that dispenser and prescriber data will not be mixed \mth other databases"). 
60 Id. (noting that the infonnation will not be linked \>rith other state databases into a national 
database). 
61 See Prescription Drug Epidemic, supra note 39, at 4 (recommending several features for a 
PDMP, which Missouri's proposed bill did not include). 
62 See, e.g., Levi et al., supra note 17, at 16 (giving greater esteem to state laws that mandate PDMP 
use). 
63 See Prescription i'.,pzde'fm.s, supra note 39, at 5 (stating that "PD MPs [should] provide 
prescription histories to prescribers so they can make clinically sound decisions prior to issuing 
prescriptions for controlled substances and can avoid being duped by doctor shoppers"). 
64 S.B. 63, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015) 
65 See Levi et al., supra note 17, at 38 (noting that combining electronic health record data and 
PDMP data improves the quality of prescription drug information available and allows rapid access 
to such information). 
66 Id. at 37 (arguing that shared information benefits state health systems and that 44 states 
share PD MP data \>rith other states \>rith 19 states requiring individuals to request the state obtain 
information from another state). 
67 Bissell, supra note 52. 
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have been used by public health departments as an effective means to combat both 
infectious and chronic disease.68 Furthermore, courts have resoundingly upheld the 
legality of surveillance by public health agencies, pharmacists, and providers because 
patients feel little harm.69 These public health activities, however, have not been without 
controversy. Individuals with the same privacy concerns as the Missouri legislature 
have unsuccessfully challenged public health surveillance activities under both the Due 
Process Clause and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. 70 
Missouri legislators opposing establishment of a PDMP have posited that such programs 
abridge individuals' freedoms. 71 Such liberty concerns are generally analyzed under the 
Due Process Clause. 72 However, the Supreme Court resolved such privacy arguments 
in 1977. 73 In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause 
protected an individual's right to privacy in his or her health information, but ultimately 
upheld the government's collection of health information so long as it was adequately 
secured. 74 In later decisions, courts interpreted Whalen as conferring a limited right 
to privacy.75 Courts now evaluate public health surveillance activities by balancing 
an individual's privacy interest against the government's interest in collecting the 
68 See, e.g., LAWRENCE 0. GosnN & LINDSEY F. ·WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAw: PowER, DuTY & 
RESTRAINT- CHAPTER 9: SURVEILLANCE & PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 28 (forthcoming 2016) (hereinafter 
Gostin & Wiley, Surveillance & Public Health Law) (explaining that in 2006, the New York City 
Board of Health responded to a diabetes epidemic by requiring laboratories (but not physicians) to 
report hemoglobinAIC test results to the city). 
69 See Lawrence 0. Gostin, "Police" Powers and Public Health Paternalism: HIV and Diabetes 
Surveillance, 37 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 9, 10 (2007) (arguing that patients have limited ammunition in 
their arguments over the privacy aspects of public health data because of the many benefits that such 
disclosures can bring). 
70 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
71 See, e.g., Loethen, supra note 50 (citing one state senator's argument that "whenever you take an 
innocent person's information and put it in a database[,] that takes away their liberty that takes away 
their freedoms"). 
72 Loethen, supra note 50. 
73 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603-604 (upholding a New York statute that required prescriptions 
of Schedule II drugs to be prepared on an official form, which identified the patient's name and 
address). 
74 See id. at 601 (holding that the impact of the release of patient identification on their reputation 
and independence was not sufficient to constitute an invasion of their Fourteenth Amendment 
privacy rights). 
75 See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm 'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457-459 (1977) (stating that when there is 
a govermnent interest at stake, any disclosure of private matters must be weighed against the public 
interest); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80 (1976) (advocating that recordkeeping 
and reporting mandates aimed at preserving the mother's health are permissible if they respect 
patient privacy); Rasmussen v. S. Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla. 1987) (reaffirming 
the two privacy interests in Whalen, the individual interest in avoiding the dissemination of private 
matters and the interest in preserving independence in making important decisions). 
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data. 76 Since HHS has declared opioid abuse to be a national epidemic,77 the Missouri 
government most likely has a compelling interest in authorizing a Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Program. Furthermore, patients feel little harm if information is only 
shared between medical providers and public health agencies. 78 Also, most authorizing 
legislation for PDMPs, including the Missouri Senate Bill79, requires data collected by 
government agencies to be encrypted, which would limit the risk of privacy breaches 
and meet the adequate surveillance test enunciated in Whalen. 80 
It is clear, under the prevailing balancing test for evaluating public health surveillance, 
that Missouri's interest in opioid prescribing information would outweigh any invasion 
of patients' privacy and would justify the Missouri Senate's proposed PDMP legislation. 
Missouri's legislature could even pass more robust legislation, which would share the 
PDMP's information with providers, without violating health information privacy 
protections conferred by the Due Process Clause. 
Opponents of PDMPs also argue that PDMPs violate privacy laws. However, the federal 
privacy law, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),81 and 
Missouri's privacy regulations82 both authorize protected health information to be 
authorized for patient treatment and public health surveillance purposes. 
Upon passing HIP AA in 1996, Congress directed the Secretary ofHHS to promulgate final 
regulations "governing standards with respect to the privacy of individually identifiable 
health information" within 42 months of the enactment of the Act. 83 In response, HHS 
published its final privacy rules in December of 2000.84 The privacy regulations only 
76 See, e.g., United States v. Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(establishing the balancing factors to be considered when justifying whether to intrude on an 
individual's privacy: type of record requested; the information it does or may contain; potential 
harm resulting from nonconsensual disclosure; injury resulting from disclosure to the relationship 
in which lhe record was generated; adequacy of the safeguards to prevent disclosure; the urgency 
of need for access; and the existence of a statutory, public policy, or public interest justification for 
access). 
77 See HHS Press Release, supra note 37. 
78 See Gostin, supra note 69, at 10 (arguing that patients are not impacted by this intrusion on their 
privacy). 
79 S.B. 63, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015). (stating that "all communications and data 
transmitted [to and from the proposed PDMP] shall be encrypted"). 
80 See Gostin & Wiley, Surveillance & Public Health Law, supra note 68, at 16 (explaining that the 
Whalen court determined that the state had adequate security measures in place, such as keeping 
computer tapes in a locked cabinet, operating the computer off-line to prevent unauthorized access, 
and disclosing data to only a limited munber of officials). 
81 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2014); 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b) (2014); see also Richard Sobel, The 
HIPAA Paradox: The Privacy Rule Thats Not, 37 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 40, 40 (Aug. 2007) 
(explaining that the HIPAA Privacy Rule is not absolute, but rather, sets forth which disclosures are 
required and permitted). 
82 Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 13, §§ 70-1.010 et seq. (2015). 
83 The Health Insurance Portability andAccmmtability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 264, 
110 Stat. 2033, 104th Cong. (1996). 
84 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2000). 
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apply to "covered entities" (including doctors, pharmacists, and HMOs)85, and prohibit 
these entities from disclosing "protected health information" (PHI)86 without patient 
permission unless a regulatory exception applies. Covered entities, however, may share 
"de-identified information" and can sometimes permissively disclose PHI. 87 HIPAA 
authorizes permissive disclosure of PHI for "public health activities,"88 and so, the 
creation of a public health surveillance system to monitor opioid prescriptions would be 
permitted under federal regulations. In the Final Rule, HHS explained that it permitted 
these exceptions because an individual's right to privacy is "not absolute."89 
However, HIPAA is only a "floor" of legal protection over each individual's protected 
health information; any state may pass more restrictive legislation if it chooses.90 
Therefore, it is necessary to analyze whether a particular state's privacy laws would 
authorize a PDMP. Missouri has similar, but arguably stricter, privacy regulations in 
comparison to HIPAA.91 Missouri mandates disclosure of contagious disease, firearm 
injuries, medication reactions, work-related injuries, and birth and death information; 
however, it does not have a broad authority for permissive disclosure of "public health 
activities."92 The number of authorities for mandatory disclosure of PHI in the Missouri 
regulations is significant and reflects the notion that the state must overcome individuals' 
privacy concerns in order to address threats to public health. However, under the Missouri 
regulations, disclosure of PHI related to opioid prescriptions could not be disclosed to the 
85 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2000) (defining a "covered entity" as "(1) a "health plan; (2) a health care 
clearinghouses,; (3), a health care provider who transmit any health information in electronic form 
in connection with a transaction covered by .... "the" Act). 
86 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (defining protected health information as "is individually identifiable health 
information ... [t]ransmitted or maintained ... transmitted in any form or medium," but excluding 
educational and employment records ... Health information must "[r ]elate to the past, present, or 
future physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an 
individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an individual"). 
87 See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.510 (2000) (listing the "Uses and disclosures for which consent, 
an authorization, or opportunity to agree or object is not required"). 
88 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b) (allowing disclosure of PHI "without individual authorization to: (1) A 
public health authority authorized by law to collect ... such information for purpose of preventing 
or controlling disease, injury, or disability, including ... reporting of disease, injury, vital events 
such as birth or death, and the conduct of public health surveillance, ... and public health 
interventions; ... "). 
89 45 C.F.R. § 160("It does not, for instance, prevent reporting of public health information on 
communicable diseases or stop law enforcement from getting information when due process has 
been observed"). 
90 Lawrence 0. Goslin & Lindsay F. Wiley, Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint, Chapter 3: 
Public Health In the Constitutional Design, 3 (forthcoming 2016) (explaining that HIEAA, similar 
to federal civil rights and consumer protection laws, achieves "floor preemption" because it only 
preempts state and local laws that fall short, however, states and localities are permitted to pass more 
robust laws if they choose). 
91 Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 13, § 70-1.010 (2015). 
92 Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 13, § 70-l .020(3)(B) ("The Department of Social Services, MO 
HealthN et Division shall provide information-!. To public health authorities to report contagious and 
reporta hie disease, including but not limited to ... birth defects, cancer, or other information for public 
health purposes; 2. Reporting of certain types of wounds or other physical injuries ... ") .... "). 
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Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services under their mandatory disclosure 
authority, which is limited to specific public health surveillance purposes.93 
However, both HIPAA and the Missouri privacy regulations permit disclosure of 
protected health information for "treatment" purposes. HIPAA provides that a covered 
entity (e.g., a physician or hospital) may disclose protected health information about an 
individual in order to treat the individual, and can consult with other health care providers 
about courses oftreatment.94 The Missouri regulations also permit the disclosure of PHI 
for treatment purposes in accordance with HIPAA.95 The Missouri regulations provide 
an expansive definition of what "treatment" warrants PHI disclosure.96 
Furthermore, the Missouri Senate Bill's proposed PDMP would not have violated 
HIPAA or the Missouri regulations, because it would have only required pharmacists 
and permitted providers to use the database for treatment purposes (e.g., deciding 
whether to fill prescriptions for opioids ). If the Missouri legislature goes further and 
creates a PDMP following the Model Act, that would not violate HIPAA or the state's 
privacy regulations because the PDMP's central purpose would be to identify and treat 
patients who are addicted to opioids.97 
CONCLUSION 
The Missouri legislature's inability to pass a PDMP has contributed to increasing opioid 
overdose rates in both Missouri and surrounding states. 98 But as a late adopter of this 
public health measure, the state legislature also has a unique opportunity to build on 
evidence-based practices to craft a resoundingly effective PDMP. Unfortunately, the 
state senate passed a largely toothless bill that the house rejected, allegedly because of 
concerns with patient privacy. 99 But these concerns are unfounded, as the right to patient 
privacy is not absolute,100 and even the most expansive PDMP legislation (e.g., the 
93 Id. 
94 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2000) (explaining that "disclosure of protected health information for 
treatment of any health care provider may include a provider sending a copy of an individual's 
medical record to a who needs the information to treat the individual"). 
95 Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 13, § 70-1.020( 4) Department of Social Services ... may 
disclose, at its discretion, a protected health information to designated business 
associates in accordance with and as authorized HIPAA ... "). 
96 Mo. Code Regs. Arm. tit. 13, § 70-l.020(4)(B) ("Treatment ofa Participant. Includes activities 
such as, providing, coordinating, or health care delivery and related services; consultation 
between providers relating to a participant; referral of a participant to another provider for health 
care; and necessary sharing of information through a health information network for treatment 
purposes ... "). 
97 Levi et al., supra note 17, at 20 (explaining that a PDMP and and 
nrescr1hers to use it, a state can prevent and treat opioid abuse). 
98 Supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (discussing that Missouri has the seventh hlghest 
opioid rate and that patients from contiguous states go to Missouri to purchase 
99 See supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text (evaluating the bill). 
100 See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 69, at l 0 (arguing that ')ustice [does not require] government to 
leave people utterly alone, free to act in ways that cause severe and premature death"). 
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PMP Model Act) does not violate the privacy protections afforded by the Constitution, 
HIPAA, and Missouri state regulations. 101 
Unfortunately, patient privacy protections are not the only barrier to passing authorizing 
legislation in Missouri; some of the state's conservative lawmakers also seem generally 
distasteful of people addicted to drugs. 102 However, such lawmakers should overcome 
such biases and join the national fight against opioid overdoses. Since Missouri does 
not have a PDMP, its legislature could and should adopt a PDMP similar to the PDMP 
envisioned in the Model Act. 103 The legislature must mandate, consistent with the 
Model Act, that both prescribers and pharmacists have full access to the database and 
must report each prescription written or dispensed to the database. 104 The Act should 
also permit interoperability with the state's electronic health records system and the 
national prescription monitoring database to help doctors better treat their patients and 
to combat interstate doctor shopping. 105 By adopting these measures, Missouri will see 
a significant reduction in opioid overdoses and could become a national leader in the 
fight against opioid overdose. 
101 See supra notes 67-95 and acc:omLpaiiy111g text 
102 See Schwarz, supra note 18 Missouri Senator Robert Schaff, a 
a PDMP, in 2012: "if 
from the gene 
103 Prescription 
104 Id. 4-5. 
105 Id. at 4. 
1'.,m·aermc. supra note 38, at 3-4. 
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